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Conclusions
o Our community’s tactical activities have created
our current security mess
o We must think strategically to improve the
situation
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Mark Lombardi
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Actions have
consequences
Are we breeding “superbugs”?
Are we forcing evolution?
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The Current Situation
o Rampant botnet populations
o Whole businesses devoted to underground
economy
o DNS, IP space abuse rampant
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Botnet Growth Reasons
o Crime pays
o Botnets go everywhere, hard to blacklist large and
dynamic sources (spam)
o Kits, code reuse
o Most operators not writing their own
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Service Oriented Economies
o Once coders detach ego from code, all bets are off
– Allow for scaling via specialization
– Carders, spammers, brokers, hosters, etc
– Botnet herders more like project managers, general
contractors
– Emergence of cloud services
• Packing, AV testing, stolen info testing, etc
o Has the law on criminal facilitation kept up?
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Rogue ASN
A rogue ASN is a network defined by its
autonomous system number that caters to the
criminal underground. This is a maturation of the
bulletproof network concept.
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Troyak-AS Saga (Winter, 2010)
o Troyak-AS - AS50215
o Eastern Europe/Russia (unclear)
o Roman Starchenko
o Considered “Bulletproof”
o Had various downstream customers
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Troyak-AS’s Nest
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Troyak-AS and SaintVPN
o Winter, 2010 - Identified as a Zeus haven
o March, 2010 - Depeering begins
– Troyak moves to St Petersberg Internet (PIN)
– Finds upstreams in AS44051, AS29632
– Moves to RT-COMM (Moscow), AS8342
– CERT-RU involved
– Depeered
o March 16, 2010 - Routes move to AS50678
SaintVPN
– Still Starchenko
– No routes advertised since March 20, 2010
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Unintended Consequences of Better Security
o Pre-Windows XP SP2
– Massive number of Windows worms
– New RPC DCOM exploits appearing frequently
o XP SP2 introduced a default-on personal firewall
o Result: attacks shifted to the client
– MS Word, Excel, PPT, Visio, Acrobat, Flash, IE, etc
– New challenge: identifying novel attacks, defending
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IPv4 and IPv6
o IPv4 oversubscription leads to
– Private CIDR trading
– High rate of address churn
• Makes identifying bots very difficult
o IPv6 promises more address
– Could lead to more stable addressing per client
– IPv6 more mobile-IP friendly
o Possible benefits from IPv4 to IPv6
– True bot capture-recapture?
– Easier infected endpoint identification?
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IPv4 Address Exhaustion
Via OECD Report: Internet Address Space, Seoul, South Korea, 15ﾐ17 June, 2008.
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IPv6 Migration Challenges
o Network monitoring
– Not as rich as IPv4
– Flow, IDS, IPS, firewalls, etc
– Operators know this, worried (Arbor WSIR 2009)
o IPv6 optional heads lead to ambiguity
– Expect a lot of bugs
– IPv6 reintroduces some classic IPv4 bugs and flaws
– NDP is just ARP, RH0 header, etc
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Rogue Network Fallout Effects on IPv4
o IPv4 address space
– April, 2010: 14/8 and 223/8 allocated
– Less than 10% of IPv4 allocatable space remains
• IANA reserved not yet touched
o “Burned” space is difficult to recover
– Can’t send mail, blacklisted forever
– May not be able to route due to ASPATH filters
– Cleanup?
• Expect a future service from someone …
o Bad guys are burning precious IPv4 space
Page 23
Whack-a-mole Fallout
o Rise of botnets
– Source-IP blacklists can’t keep up
o Dramatic increase in malware variations
– Minor variations (MD5), tools have not kept up
o Fast flux domain names
o Domain generation algorithms
o End-user patch management
– Made worse by some vendors’ failure to remove old stuff
properly (Adobe, Java)
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New Technologies as Opportunities
o Cloud
– Dramatic rise in cloud services
– Basic cloud services free
o Social media
– Dramatic increase
– Large number of competing networks
– New communications layer
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August, 2009: Upd4t3 Microblogging Botnet
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TwitterNet Botnet Kit
o Found and analyzed in May 2006
o Backdoored, version 2.0 removed that backdoor
o Much like IRC bots but uses Twitter instead
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Why the Cloud?
Via joelaz.com
Via insidefacebook.como Hide in the noise
– Tremendous amounts of
traffic in these sites
o Uptime
– Guaranteed by provider
o Price: Free
– Up to a point
– Success limiting
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DNS Attacking Trends
o New avenues for attackers
– Hijack
– Poison
– Malicious DNS names
o Attack the weak DNS infrastructure
– Registries
– Registrars
– DNS servers
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Twitter, Baidu DNS Hijack
Twitter’s DNS
administrator account
was compromised at the
registrar, redirected to
new servers.
Same attack used
against Baidu
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DNS TLDs
o New initiatives
– Registration crackdowns in .cn, .ru
– Proof of identity, statement of intent for use
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TLD Crackdown Results and Fallout
o Dramatic effect on .cn
– Massive decrease in rogue .cn TLDs registered
o No such long-term drop in .ru
– Restored, largely
• Why? False documentation business existed
o Shift to other TLDs
– .com, .net
o Shift to attacking legitimate sites
– Gumblar, Gootkit, etc
o Shift to dynamic DNS providers
– 3332.org, etc
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Conclusions From History
o Our community’s tactical activities have created
our current security mess
o We have pressured attackers into innovating
o Failure to contain the problem has lead to
unchecked growth
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What Now?
o We must think strategically to improve the
situation
o Evaluate the likely consequences of our actions
o Act in concert
o Act in the right order
o Develop, fund, launch such research programs
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“Cyber warfare”?
o Attacks appear to follow diplomatic issues, not
lead
o Attack damage not on par with loss of life (GE, etc)
– Inconvenience only
o Therefore, in general …
– We assume non-state actors
– We assume “right wing” political motivations
– We assume news reports stir public
Page 37
Elections - Intimidation
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Diplomatic Tensions - Support of One Nation
